



Historical Development of the Methodologies of al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen And Their Effect and Influence Upon Contemporary Salafee Dawah

Part 2

The Historical Fitnah Of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Penetration Of Its Ideas and Thoughts Into Ahl us-Sunnah

With a History of the Salafee Da'wah in the United Kingdom And the Effects of the Ikhwaanee Methodologies and Its Callers Upon the Salafee Da'wah

PART 2

- 2.1 Migration of al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen Into Saudi Arabia
- 2.2 Usamah bin Ladin, the Jihaadee Movement, Asian Geo-Politics and Terrorism
- 2.3 Recent Times Following the Gulf War
- 2.4 Expression of the Two Strains of Ikhwaanee Thought
- 2.5 More Influences of These Ideas upon “Islamist” Reformists

Summary of Part 2

The persecution of many of the Ikhwaan in the 1950s and 1960s (due to their extremist methodologies, brought about by the teachings of Sayyid Qutb) led a fair number of them to flee to Saudi Arabia, who took them with open arms, and welcomed them and gave them employment, and considered their welfare. Amongst them was Mohammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb. Later in the 70s and 80s during the oil boom, more migration took place for the sake of employment and taking of teaching and university posts. This was also a time when Muhammad Suroor made his way to Saudi Arabia. This migration naturally brought with it the ideologies that originated in Egypt and the Indo-Pak subcontinent, those of Qutb, Mawdudi and Bannaa. Over time, due to the active propagation of these ideas, distinct thoughts and trends emerged, and hizbiyyah (partisan) settled in, and the Jamaa'at (groups) emerged (after their non-existence), and many of the youth (who would later become spokesmen for the Ikhwaan) were nurtured upon these ideas from an early age upwards. This would later culminate in the more explicit expression of these original ideologies of Ikhwaan amongst the Salafees, following the breakout of the Gulf War in the 1990s.

Around the same period, in the 1980s, the CIA sponsored Afghanistan War broke out, and many fighters were mobilised from the Muslim lands, mainly the Takfeeree elements from North Africa. The Afghanistan War against the Soviets lasted ten years, and during that period, a Jihaadee movement emerged. Bin Ladin with support and help from the CIA-ISI partnership, was instrumental in mobilising many of these fighters on behalf of the real sponsors of the war. After the 1990s, and after many of these Mujaahideen dispersed, some returned back to their lands and others moving into other areas of conflict. The Afghanistan War brought together many people from different lands, and it also led to the spread of ideologies amongst the Mujaahideen. In particular, many of those originating from the Gulf States were affected by the ideologies of takfeer and revolution. This entered an additional mindset and orientation within the da'wah, which was that of the Jihaad of fighting as an independent isolated methodology of reform, mixed with aspects of takfeer, rebellious ideology, and clashings with the governments – all without any fundamental appreciation of the Sunan of Allaah in His creation, and the Usool of the Sunnah relating to this particular subject. This saw the emergence of a new orientation in the da'wah, which would then filter through to the various lands and regions.

After 1990, the Gulf War brought out the Ikhwaanee, Qutubee, Surooree and Jihaadee elements that were lurking in the background (due to what had taken place over the previous decades), and when they became vocal with their methodologies and ideologies, many unsuspecting people who were not aware of the nurturing they had received, thought they were Salafees, and upon the Salafee manhaj and aqeedah, when in reality they were upon the manhaj of the Khawaarij, as would be later explained by many of the Major Scholars of the Ummah. However, because some of these people emerged from within Saudi Arabia, which is not identified with anything but Salafiyyah historically, many people were deceived by these activists and became poisoned by their ideologies. It was the years after the Gulf War that brought about direct turmoil within the ranks of Ahl us-Sunnah, the Salafees, since these individuals or so-called reformers from Saudi Arabia, served as the route by which the ideologies of their true

teachers and mentors (like Mohammad Qutb, and Mohammad Suroor and others) would bring confusion about the affairs of the Sunnah and the methodologies of the Salaf. This importation of ideas naturally entailed an expression of the ideologies of Qutb, Bannaa and Mawdudi, in the form of many new principles, ideas, doctrines and methodologies, which can be broadly summarised into two categories, the **Q-Strain** (which is mainly focused around takfeer, revolutions, and concern with rulers and governments, and ruling by the Sharee'ah) and **B-Strain** (which is mainly focused upon collective work, democratic activity, political involvement, mass-movements, Muslim unity merely for the sake of unity, and so on).

The influence of these ideas upon the so-called activists who outwardly claimed Salafiyyah were clearly visible, and key amongst these Ikhwaanified activists were Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq, Mohammad Suroor, Safar al-Hawaali, Salmaan al-Awdah and many others.

The earlier reformers, like Qutb, Bannaa and Mawdudi did not make any strong or forceful ascription to Salafiyyah. But in the name of Islaam, they devised many erroneous methodologies of reform. Thus, the general people of that time, who were ignorant, did not suspect there to be any errors in these methodologies. Their later followers, like those listed above, in more recent times, made an open ascription to Salafiyyah, by associating themselves with the Salafee aqeedah, and thus many people, who were ignorant of the deviant methodologies, did not suspect them in the methodologies that they were nurturing the youth upon. This in turn caused many people to be deceived by them and their methodologies, whose true inspirational and conceptual roots actually trace back to the father of modern pan-Islamic activism, Jamaal ud-Deen al-Afghaani (al-Iraanee), an Iranian Zindeeq.

2.1 Migration of al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen into Saudi Arabia

The persecution in Egypt of the Muslim Brotherhood, following the political turmoil that had been created, led to many of its members and influential figureheads to flee from Egypt and seek sanctuary elsewhere. This took place beginning in the late 50s and continued over the 60s – following assassination attempts made upon Jamal Abd an-Nasser. The opposition to Nasser came from two directions, firstly, Sayyid Qutb (who was actually the ideological mastermind behind the revolution in 1953 that brought Nasser in power, and Qutb's Brotherhood cooperated with the "Free Officers" army generals including Nasser and Sadat prior to the years before this coup against the monarchy), and secondly, British Intelligence, who were livid with Nasser's declaration of independence and nationalization of the Suez Canal, and his Arabic nationalist call that became quite popular, thereby affecting the regional balance of power.

More movements out of Egypt occurred during the next two decades, especially following the oil boom of the 70s and 80s, when many workers migrated from neighbouring Arab and non-Arab lands. In addition to this, Ikhwaanees who had been given employment in Saudi Arabia took many teaching and university positions. The books of Sayyid Qutb naturally followed all of this migration into Saudi Arabia over the past few decades, and those of Mawdudi had already been in circulation. In addition certain figureheads also found their way into Saudi Arabia, the most influential of them, Mohammad Qutb¹, the brother of Sayyid Qutb (still alive today) and Muhammad Suuroo who spent time in Qaseem (currently lives in London, UK, where he devises his plots for the Muslim lands, and issues orders to his secret Jamaa'ah). And of course there were many other active Ikhwaanee members, who began to call to their methodologies during these two decades. In this way, the Ikhwaani thought and ideology found its way into the minds of many of the youth, and over the two decades it would gradually find its influence in many different spheres, including those that were social, educational, media, publishing, and some aspects of the political structure. This was because the Saudi state behaved benevolently with them, and allowed them to take teaching and other positions, in order to allow them to subsist, and provide for themselves.

However, the influence they gained by way of this, would later pave the way for the subsequent separation of the hearts and the emergence of the Jamaa'at of Hizbiyyah who propagated these imported ideologies and methodologies.

The matter has been summed up nicely by Shaykh Saalih al-Fawzaan who said, "And the end part of that is what we are living in now, the arrival of strange and suspectful ideas in our land in the name of 'da'wah' - through the hands of the various groups which are called by various names such as al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen, Jamaa'at ut-Tabligh and the Jamaa'ah of such and such. And the goal of all of them is the one and same and that is to drive away the da'wah of Tawheed and to take up its place [with something else]. And in reality, the intent of these groups is not different from the

¹ He fled to Saudi Arabia in the 1960s, following the persecution from Jamal Abdul-Nasser against al-Ikhwaan.

intent of those who have preceded them from amongst the enemies of this blessed da'wah - all of them desire to put an end to it. However the difference between them is only with respect to their plans of action. And if not, then if these groups had desired - truthfully - da'wah to Allaah, then why do they overlook and abandon their own countries - from where they are dispatched to us? And yet these same countries are most in need of da'wah and rectification². They overlook their own countries and then they come out to battle against the land of Tawheed, desiring to change its correct course of rectification to one that is twisted - and they desire to deceive its youth and to bring about fitnah and enmity between them..." (Haqeeqat ud-Da'wah ilallaah of Sa'd Abdur-Rahmaan al-Haseen, and it is also found in other sources)

Shaykh Saalih al-Fawzaan also said, "... and they used to be a single Jamaa'ah, and in a good condition, up until ideas from outside came by way of individuals who came (to this land), or by way of books and magazines (i.e. of the Ikhwaan and others), and then the youth adopted them, and thus splitting occurred, because those youth who deviated from the Salafee manhaj in da'wah, they were affected by these ideologies entered from outside. As for the du'aat and youth who remained upon a tight link with their scholars, they were not affected by these external ideologies, so they, walhamdulillah, are upon uprightness, like their righteous Salaf. So the cause of this splitting returns to the adoption of those ideologies, and the methodologies in da'wah, that came from other than the scholars of this country, from a people that were suspect, or people who cause others to stray, they desire to put an end to this blessing which we live in, in this country, that of security, firmness, establishment of the Sharee'ah, and the great amount of goodness in this land, that is not to be found in other lands, and they wish to divide us, and to take our youth away, and that they take away the trust in the scholars, and then when this occurs, and refuge is in Allaah, there occurs that whose end result cannot be praised..." (p. 49-50, al-Ajwibah al-Mufeedah).

Amir Nayif bin Abdul-Azeez, the Interior Minister of Saudi Arabia, in a recent statement explained that the Muslim Brotherhood is the origin, base of the tribulation(s). He said, "Without any hesitation I say it, that our problems, all of them came from the direction of the Muslim Brotherhood". He added, "With the judgement of my responsibility, I say that when the affairs became severe upon the Brotherhood, and many hardships were brought upon them in their state (Egypt), they sought refuge in the Kingdom, and it accommodated them and defended them, and after Allaah, it saved their lives, and also preserved their nobility and their rights, and made them secure. And our brothers in other Arab lands accepted this arrangement and they said that they (the Brotherhood) should not become active in the Kingdom. Then after spending years amongst us we found that they sought employment, and so we made all the ways possible for them. There were teachers amongst them, and principals,

² Such as Egypt, where there are found the tombs and shrines of Husain, Badawi, Tusuqi, Sinjar, Zainab and others, which are travelled to, called upon and worshipped besides Allaah. And likewise from the Indo-Pak Subcontinent, where the Major Shirk is found in abundance, alongside colossal amounts of innovation, superstition and misguidance. So many of these people left all of that and came to "establish Tawheed" in the land of Tawheed! In reality, they came for position and power and authority, under the banner of "al-Haakimiyyah" and to remove "social injustice" whilst they left the greatest injustice (dhulm, i.e. Shirk) in their own lands, untouched.

headmasters, so we opened the doors of the schools and universities for them. But unfortunately, they did not forget completely, their previous attachment (to their ideas), and so they began to muster the people, and initiate movements (from within). Then they became opposed to the Kingdom!" (Interview with as-Siyaasah Newspaper of Kuwait in November 2002).

2.2 Usamah Bin Ladin, The Jihaadee Movement, Asian Geo-Politics and Terrorism

Another factor that needs to be included in our analysis is the emergence of the Jihaadee movement, and its entry into the arena of da'wah following the end of the Afghanistan War and the Gulf War. This movement would also add, in later time, considerable confusion, in the arenas of takfeer, priorities and methodologies of jihad, the methodology of the Prophets in calling to Allaah, and other related matters. The vast majority of the followers of this movement were actually ignorant of the Salafee aqeedah, as their origin was from an Ikhwaanee, Takfeeree, Qutbi background. It was only due to interaction with those who went for Jihaad from the Gulf countries that many of these people came into contact with the Salafee aqeedah. However, as more and more of them began to identify with the Salafee aqeedah in the various lands that they were to be found, their ideas were able to spread more freely amongst Salafee circles.

The great oil rush of the end of the 20th century has seen major events take place around the Central Asian region, involving powerful factions competing for control of the resources lying in the Central Asian states. The paymasters of the CIA engineered and sponsored the Afghanistan Jihaad³ from the late 70s until the late 80s for geo-political strategies that continue to be rolled out today in the Central Asian region⁴. Using the Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)⁵ agency as the go-between, they utilised individuals like Bin-Ladin⁶ through the Makbat al-Khidamar (MAK)

³ As is readily admitted in an interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser in 'Le Nouvel Observateur' (France), Jan 15-21, 1998 p.76. Brzezinski said, "Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention."

⁴ "Afghanistan was by far the biggest; it was, in fact, the biggest CIA operation of all time, both in terms of dollars spent (\$5-\$6 billion) and personnel involved..." from the book *The CIA's Greatest Hits*.

⁵ The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI] was founded in 1948 by a British army officer, Major General R. Cawthome, then Deputy Chief of Staff in Pakistan Army, and has since that time, been used by British and American Intelligence, to influence the geo-politics of Central Asia.

⁶ Usamah bin Ladin, as readily admitted by his former CIA backers was "an intelligence asset" during the Afghanistan War, and he aided in construction projects, and also brought financial backing (from his family business), as well as serving as one of main recruiter for fighters from the Muslim lands. His origin is from Yemen, from a family with a Soofee background, and when in Saudi Arabia (to where his father migrated) he was taught by Abdullaah Azzaam and Mohammad Qutb. It is reported also that the Bin Ladin family are known for Tasawwuf, and it has also been said that Muhammad 'Alawee (the Soofee Heretic) was also at one time, a teacher of Usaamah bin Laadin, during his earlier years.

organisation to recruit people for the Jihaad against the Soviet Union⁷. The main elements of this movement came from North Africa from the remnants of the takfeer groups, who were upon the ideologies of Sayyid Qutb, and had already embarked upon methodologies of takfeer and clashing with the authorities in their lands (influenced by the doctrines of Qutb). Using Bin Ladin, many more Mujaahideen were recruited from the Gulf and other countries by way of an effective campaign, which brought both fighters and lots of money, to wage this Jihaad against the Soviet Union.

Of course the motivations and intentions of many Muslims and Muslim governments supporting this war, financially and otherwise, were devoid of any realisation or perception of the geo-strategic objectives behind this war, and they simply wished to assist the Afghani Muslims⁸. Many organisations, including banks, charitable, business fronts and otherwise, were used or set up, both in the Muslim lands and in the lands of the Kuffar (many of them by the Kuffar themselves) to sponsor this war and to funnel money into it, this included the infamous BCCI. A prolonged but successful war eventually led to the withdrawal of the then Soviet Union (1989), which only a year or so later would collapse, ending the Cold War.

The objectives of the faction sponsoring this war against the Soviet Union were realised with:

- a) The demise and disintegration of the regional superpower, the Soviet Union very shortly after being displaced from Afghanistan, and the weakening of its role in the new Central Asian gas and oil rush of the end of the 20th century, the planned Soviet-Afghan pipeline was effectively blocked, by a coalition of the CIA-ISI and the Jihaadee recruits
- b) Increase in revenues of the drug trade operating out of Afghanistan-Pakistan (reaching \$300 billion annually in later years),
- c) Paving the way for increased geo-political control in Central Asia to secure oil, gas and other multi-billion dollar ventures, or to put it another way making slight shifts in the balance of regional power, to gain long term strategic economic and financial benefits

The contemporary Jihaadee movement was actually born out of this mobilisation period during the 1980s. It emerged and subsequently argued for its legitimation not primarily upon the base origin of establishing the Tawheed of Allaah, beginning with the knowledge based aspects, and then what follows on from it, and calling the people

⁷ Maktab al Khidamar (Office of Services — MAK) was a front for Pakistan's CIA, the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate. Bin Laden was one of three people who ran MAK. In 1989, he took overall charge of MAK, and this served as the precursor to the al-Qaa'idah movement.

⁸ And seeing that a non-Muslim aggressor (the Communists) had invaded a Muslim land and waged war (irrespective of how this was brought about), the People of Knowledge announced the legitimacy of the Jihaad against the Soviets.

to it, and facing the harms during its course⁹, but due instead to these global events, that were often engineered by outside forces.

In the case of the Afghan war, it was a period in which those who initially, under the strong influence of the doctrines of Qutb and Mawdudi, perceived Jihaad to be the struggle with oppressive governments (during the late 60s and through the 70s), were later mobilised into the conflict with the Communist Soviets and entered into the realm of the struggle against non-Muslim aggressors. So after failing in their "Jihaad" against their governments (who faced them with an onslaught of oppression, imprisonment and repression after they had adopted the methodologies of Qutb and Mawdudi, made takfeer of their governments, and focused their methodologies upon replacing the rulers by violent and revolutionary means) they left to engage in the Jihaad in Afghanistan.

Towards the end of the Afghan war, a split occurred between Abdullaah Azzam and those with him and Bin Ladin and those with him. Bin Ladin was going in the direction of setting up a global Jihad movement and wished to use the funds acquired for the Afghani war to wage global Jihads and more direct conflicts with Muslim governments and non-Muslim states. On the other hand Abdullaah Azzam wished to restrict the usage of the funds for the particular purpose at hand, which was the Afghani Jihaad. This led them to separate their ways.¹⁰ Bin Ladin continued in his direction and set up a movement of Jihadists (al-Qaa'idah), consisting, overwhelmingly, of Takfeerees, and remnants of the Jamaa'at of Takfeer from North Africa, and those affected by them from the Gulf countries.

Following the end of the Afghanistan war, some of the Mujaahideen returned to their countries, and others continued to other places of conflict, such as Bosnia, Chechnya¹¹,

⁹ Like the da'wah of the Prophets and Messengers and that of Shaykh ul-Islam Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhaab.

¹⁰ This matter is covered in more detail later in this treatise.

¹¹ The secret behind the Chechnyan conflict returns back to oil, with competition between the USSR, and US companies for establishing monopoly over pipelines running through the Caucasus, and therefore control over distribution. A continuing conflict in Chechnya is in the interests of the US faction.

"Though Georgia and Chechnya themselves contain limited oil and gas reserves, their territory is essential to both existing and proposed pipelines to carry oil and gas out of the Caspian basin west to Turkey and Europe. The existing Russian pipeline, from Baku to Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, passes through Chechnya. U.S. oil companies, which have had difficulty dealing with the Russians, have proposed two alternative pipeline routes that pass through Georgia and Armenia. These pipelines would allow U.S. companies, and not Russian ones, to control oil and pipeline prices." (It's the Oil Pipeline, Stupid, By Peter Dale Scott, Pacific News Service, March 5, 2002)

"In a speech at a major military meeting to review 1999 and look ahead to 2000, Sergeyev said the United States and NATO were the main culprits in making this year "extremely unstable" because of the Western alliance's new post-Cold War strategic concept and its campaign against Yugoslavia. "The West's policy is a challenge to Russia with the aim of weakening its international position and ousting it from strategically important regions of the world, above all the Caspian region, the trans-Caucasus and Central Asia," he said in televised remarks. Chechnya lies in Russia's mountainous North Caucasus

Kosovo, Macedonia¹² and elsewhere. Interestingly, these areas of conflict also happen to be of great geo-political concern to the oil and gas industry giants comprising the military-industrial complex that often plays the role in initiating conflicts and providing arms and support to those whose “engineered cause” supports their own goals. These conflicts are most often veils for their own long-term interests, the prime example being Afghanistan in the 1980s.

By way of these various Jihaads, a new orientation was entered into the field of da'wah, having its roots in the Afghani Jihad and this paved the way for the Jihaadee discourse during the 90s onwards. The contemporary Jihaadee orientation has its roots in two paradigms of thought:

- a) The Mawdudo-Qutb paradigm, which represents the struggles and confrontations between oppressive governments and their subjects
- b) The Azzaam-Bin Ladin paradigm, which represents military responses to non-Muslim aggressions against Muslims

The great emotive aspects of many of the events and occurrences¹³ that took place and around which this ideological legitimation of the Jihaadee manhaj was based, caused a general departure from the true understanding and priorities of the methodologies of Jihad, and the methodologies of the Prophets, and the true nature of the Jihad of the

region, bordering Georgia and close to the Caspian Sea's oil and gas riches. A vital oil pipeline runs across Chechnya from the Caspian to the Black Sea but it is no longer under Russian control and Moscow is building a bypass. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin attended the last day of the three-day meeting with senior commanders and Kremlin officials.” (“Russia says U.S. wants to oust it from Caucasus,” Reuters, Nov. 12, 1999)

“This is about America's energy security. Its also about preventing strategic inroads by those who don't share our values. We are trying to move these newly independent countries toward the West. We would like to see them reliant on Western commercial and political interests. We've made a substantial political investment in the Caspian and it's important that both the pipeline map and the politics come out right.” Bill Richardson, then-U.S. Secretary Energy (1998-2000). Cited by George Monbiot, “A discreet deal in the pipeline,” The Guardian, Feb. 15, 2001.

“Central Asian resources may revert back to the control of Russia or to a Russian led alliance. This would be a nightmare situation. We had better wake up to the dangers or one day the certainties on which we base our prosperity will be certainties no more. The potential prize in oil and gas riches in the Caspian sea, valued up to \$4 trillion, would give Russia both wealth and strategic dominance. The potential economic rewards of Caspian energy will draw in their train Western military forces to protect our investment if necessary.” Mortimer Zuckerman Editor, U.S. News and World Report in “The Big Game Gets Bigger: Russia will gain wealth and influence if it controls Caspian Sea oil”, U.S. News & World Report, May 10, 1999.

¹² The Balkan Crisis is also linked to oil and gas. Kosovo serves as the alternative route for transportation of Caucasus gas and oil into the Mediterranean (as opposed to Afghanistan leading to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean). The destabilisation of Yugoslavia, militarization of the Balkans and the conflicts that have taken place in Kosovo, Macedonia are manifestations of the US desire to gain a monopoly over the Central Asian gas and oil reserves.

¹³ Such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and others.

Prophets and Messengers. Thus what was something that is resorted to according to need and circumstance (the Jihaad of repelling or Jihaad ud-Daf'), was made into an overall manhaj with which to deal, fundamentally, with all of the Ummah's problems and was frequently entered into the realms of the Jihaad of seeking increase (Jihaad ut-Talab)¹⁴. This was because those who participated in this Jihaad came from takfeeree and revolutionary backgrounds, and historically speaking, Jihaad, to them, was represented in the armed struggle against the oppressive governments – and this was connected to the doctrines of Mawdudi and Qutb. This mindset was then transferred to many different lands following the spread of literature, writings, books and other media. This is why you find the people of knowledge, such as Imaam al-Albaani, Shaykh Muhammad bin Haadee and Shaykh Abdul-Muhsin al-'Ubaykaan and others stating that many of those associated with Jihaad today, are upon Takfeer and the manhaj of the Khawaarij¹⁵.

¹⁴ Refer to Shaikh al-Albaani's excellent refutation of this way of thinking, in the famous debate between him and a Jihaadee (IBD170004 @ Spubs.Com).

¹⁵ Shaykh al-Albaanee was asked, "O Esteemed Shaykh! It is not hidden to you what the Afghani plains contained of the groups and sects of misguidance, which increased in that time amongst its ranks, and which also attempted to spread - unfortunately - their ideologies that are foreign to the manhaj of the Salaf us-Saalih, within our Salafi youth who used to make Jihaad in Afghanistan, and amongst these ideas is the Takfir of the Rulers, and also reviving the abandoned ways, such as assassinations, as they claim. And now, after the return of these Salafi youth to their lands (after the Jihaad), some of them have stood to spread these opinions and doubts between the youth in their own societies..."

And in part of his reply he remarked, "...This point is often forgotten - and its requirement and necessity is often unheeded - by many of those with knowledge [those engaged in the call to Allaah], let alone those besides them who, in recent times have become known as 'Jamaa'at ut-Takfeer'! **Or some of the various types of groups who have associated themselves with Jihaad. However, in reality these groups are but from the remnants of takfeer!!** So these people - and those others - often count themselves amongst the righteous and the sincere, but this alone is not sufficient for a person to be considered, in the sight of Allaah, the Mighty and Magnificent, amongst those who will be delivered and succeed..." (In "Fitnah of Takfir" that was published in numerous books, magazines and newspapers, and was praised by Shaikh Ibn Baaz).

And Shaikh Abdul-Muhsin al-'Ubaykaan who was once with the Qutubiyah, but then abandoned them after knowing their realities, has recently published a book entitled, "The Khawaarij and the Renewed Ideology", in which he confirms that many of those who went for Jihaad in Afghanistan from the Gulf states, after mixing with the Takfeeris of North Africa, came back upon the ideas of the Khawaarij. He said, "The origins of Takfeer came by way of a people who were from outside of this land (Saudi Arabia), and then they spread amongst the ranks of the impressionable and zealous youth, amongst the ones whom had not been showered with the blessings of the da'wah salafiyyah. Hence, they planted hateful partisanship amongst the youth, and they [laid down] structures in traversing upon [the ways of] the astray groups. And then the youth left from this land to Afghanistan, and found over there those who would teach them, nurture them, and give them experience in the manhaj of takfeer. And those who were responsible for this nurturing left their own lands due to harm from their Rulers, because they clashed with them. And it was more befitting from them all that they remained in their land calling to Allaah with that which is best, and that they should strive their utmost in giving sincere advice to the Ummah, and strive as much as they are able in giving advice and da'wah, and not clash with those who will turn upon them and who are able to harm them. However, the manhaj of the Khawaarij is the manhaj of confrontations, the kindling of tribulations and commotions, and giving open advice to the Rulers and publicising their affairs and so on. When they clashed with their Rulers,

The main bulk of those recruited for the Jihaad in Afghanistan were the remnants of the Khawaarij in North Africa, the Jamaa'at ul-Jihad, the Jamaa'at ut-Takfeer wal-Hijrah, and the Jamaa'at ut-Tabayyun wat-Tawaqquf and others. Many of those who came to Afghanistan from the Gulf countries as opposed to North Africa, who became influenced by the Jihaadee discourse would also be affected by the "Ikhwaani baggage" that was part and parcel of it. Thus, those who were of Salafee aqeedah, originating from the Gulf, adopted some of the Ikhwaanee and Takfeeree methodologies. And similarly, many of those who were Ash'aree, Mu'tazilees from North Africa and elsewhere, from the Ikhwaan and its Takfeeree splinter groups, adopted the Salafee aqeedah, thinking that they had adopted Salafiyyah as a whole, whilst remaining upon the ideologies and methodologies they had been nurtured upon from the books of Qutb, Mawdudi and others. This led to a conglomeration of "Ikhwani-Salafi" types, with the common denominator of Salafee aqeedah¹⁶, but a number of different outlooks and directions in methodologies of reform, all varying in their nature and extremity. Their entrance into the field of da'wah and inviting to their methodologies would cause further confusion, in addition to that which would be unleashed following the effects of the Gulf War in 1990 upon the course of the Salafee da'wah. Thus, the Mawdudo-Qutb paradigm and the Azzaam-Bin Ladin paradigm was given further propagation by way of the participants of the Afghani Jihaad who originated from the Gulf countries and returned to them, and began calling to and preaching these ideas, and whatever was connected to them of errors in the subjects of takfeer, and methodologies of correction and reformation and so on.

It was important to mention this, so as to bring in all the relevant factors that help to give a more complete and clear picture of the affairs of the da'wah and the spectrum of orientations that were to be found, all of which led or added to the proliferation of confusion. Refer also to the section on Bin Ladin and al-Qaidah, later in this treatise.

they were imprisoned after that, and were harmed and were expelled so some of them fled. Then there occurred a reaction to all of this in their actions, in light of the nurturing and education they had given to their followers upon this corrupt manhaj of takfeer of the scholars, and takfeer of many of the Muslims, and takfeer of the Rulers, whilst they were the most ignorant of people of the affairs of aqeedah and the sound manhaj. One amongst them might memorise some ahaadeeth and something of knowledge, and then he makes himself a Muftee, and a Shaykh of Islaam, and so he makes takfeer upon the Ummah, and he is the only one who is correct. So some of the youth are affected by them, those who did not have any protection, and did not equip themselves with knowledge." (Al-Khawaarij wal-Fikr al-Mutajaddid p.31)

And similarly Shaikh Muhammad bin Haadee al-Madkhalee noted the same in some of his cassettes, saying that "they left us considering us to be believers and they came back considering us to be disbelievers."

¹⁶ With the exception that many were upon the aqeedah of the Khawaarij, an aqeedah upon which their methodologies of reform were based. But they thought that adoption of the aqeedah of Imaam Ahmad, Ibn Taymiyyah and of the Salaf in the other affairs, brought them to Salafiyyah.

2.3 Recent Times Following the Gulf War

Upon Saddam Hussain's¹⁷ invasion of Kuwait, and the threat of invasion to Saudi Arabia, the Scholars of Saudi Arabia looked into the situation, and looked into the Sharee'ah to see if the Sharee'ah allowed seeking the aid of a non-Muslim force to repel an aggressor. So after looking into this matter, considering various parameters and making ijtihaad in the issue and ruling that it is permissible to hire an external army for the duration of the potential or actual threat from an external aggressor, their occurred whatever occurred thereafter, according to Allaah's decree. No doubt the Kuffar had their aims and goals, and took Saddam Hussain's daring adventurism in invading Kuwait as an opportunity towards that end.

Naturally, great confusion occurred after this worldly tribulation, and this confusion led to a climate in which the further entrance and penetration of the ideas of Abu A'laa Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna into the ranks of Ahl us-Sunnah was facilitated, by way of a people outwardly appearing to be upon Salafiyyah but who had been poisoned by these ideas (in the many years, if not decades prior to the Gulf War) by some of the heads of Innovation, such as Mohammad Qutb, Mohammad Suroor¹⁸, and others, and who took the event of the Gulf War as an effective propaganda campaign for their methodologies, agendas and goals.

In reality, this confusion arose due to al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimoon having managed to penetrate, at long last, the ranks of Ahl us-Sunnah, on account of their entry and migration into Saudi Arabia, as teachers, university lecturers and other than that, during the previous two decades (70s and 80s) and in some instances earlier than that, in the 1960s when many from Egypt fled from Nasser.

So In the 60s, 70s and 80s, following the movements of al-Ikhwaan into Saudi Arabia, some of the youth were affected by some of the Ikhwaani figureheads and by these innovations. Prior to the Gulf war there was no open call to these ideas. During this time, in the 80s, individuals such as Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awdah were being

¹⁷ The Scholars of Ahl us-Sunnah have made explicit takfeer of Saddam Hussain, including Shaykh Ibn Baaz, Shaykh Saalih al-Fawzaan and Shaykh Muqbil. Shaykh Ibn Baaz said, "He is a disbeliever, even if he says 'Laa ilaaha illallaaha', and even if he prays and fasts, so long as he has not freed himself from the foundations of the heretical Ba'thism (a form of communism), and announces that he has repented to Allaah, and calls to Him. This is because Ba'thiyyah is kufr and misguidance." Shaykh Ibn Baaz made takfeer of Saddam Hussain well before the Gulf War (whilst others like Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq thought he was a great Muslim leader). And Shaykh Muqbil said, "Verily he believes in al-Jibt and at-Taaghoot, and he is a transgressing Ba'thee", in his book Tuhfat ul-Mujeeb.

¹⁸ He is the one whom the term "Suroori" was coined after. Mohammad Suroor, like Mawdudi, portrayed the da'wah of the Prophets as revolutions, and violent dashes with the authorities of the time, and snatching away power from them. He fell into takfir of the rulers and the scholars of Saudi Arabia, and was also establishing a secret underground Jamaa'ah within Saudi Arabia (operated of course courtesy of the generous hospitality of the Queen of England shown to Suroor and his likes), with the aim of wresting power away from the current rulers. Amongst his students and protégées was Salmaan al-Awdah, who frequented him, whilst Suroor was in Kuwait, and also Qaseem, Saudi Arabia.

influenced and tutored by the likes of Mohammad Qutb¹⁹ and Mohammad Suroor and being nurtured upon the books of Sayyid Qutb, Mawdudi and others. And similarly Abdur-Rahman Abdul-Khaaliq and his Jam'iyyah, Ihyaa at-Turaath was operative at that time. Abdur-Rahman Abdul-Khaliq, despite his initial staunch opposition to the Ikhwaan, and his being engrossed with them, finally caved in and was greatly affected by them, and ended up propounding their ideologies, and serving as one of the greatest of vehicles in spreading this Ikhwaanee thought amongst the Salafees²⁰.

The Gulf war was what brought these ideologies more into the open. Previously, those people who were affected with these ideas were considered to be Salafee, merely because they held onto the Salafee aqeedah and refuted the Ash'arees and some of the Modernists and the Soofees and so on. However, in reality, they had, from an early period, and over time, been nurtured upon the ideologies and the beliefs of the Khawaarij, that of "imaamah", "haakimiyyah", "takfeer" and "khurooj", and at the same time, they were accommodating, and praising the same Innovators, and reading (and teaching) their books, like Sayyid Qutb, Mawdudi, and Hassan al-Banna whose teachings they had been affected by. The most famous of these individuals are Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaliq, Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awdah. And this fitnah came to them from al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen and some of its figureheads who found their way into Saudi Arabia.

The existing norms of laxity with the Innovators, which had been effected by the ideas of Hassan al-Bannaa and the Ikhwaan in general over the decades, (and which slowly entered into the ranks of Ahl us-Sunnah), did not allow these individuals to realise the dangers of the Innovators, and that mixing with them, befriending them, and learning from them, (or even debating fruitlessly with them in the case of Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq) and that all of this is opposed to the manhaj of the Salaf. Thus, in this manner, they became affected by their methodologies and their beliefs, some of them from an early period in their youth. Then in later times, they became the chief spokesmen for these ideas of Qutb, Mawdudi and Bannaa in Saudi Arabia and in Kuwait and elsewhere in the Gulf, and they were no more than stooges of Mohammad Qutb (the brother of Sayyid Qutb) and Mohammad Suroor and others. And the connections of some of them (such as Salman al-Awdah) to those who poisoned them (like Mohammad Suroor) were established during their youth.

So in 1990, the Gulf War that brought out many controversies triggered a series of events that led to the further proliferation of these ideas and methodologies amidst Ahl us-Sunnah in the various lands. The Gulf War was actually used as a basis to make a more open call, and this sect only came out openly, because discussing, debating and

¹⁹ Mohammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb is a "dangerous Ash'aree" (as stated by Shaykh Hammad al-Ansaaree) and a Takfeeree and has been a staunch proponent of the methodologies of his brother, within Saudi Arabia.

²⁰ As has been explained by Shaykh Muhammad al-Bannaa, and also by Shaykh al-Albaani (rahimahullaah) who explained his the manhaj of Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq to be Ikhwaani.

theorising about this major event, would allow them to fulfil their subsidiary objectives that were:

- a) Bringing down the true scholars by accusing them of being ignorant and not knowing the true state of affairs
- b) Raising themselves as those who know the “waaqi” (state of affairs) and
- c) Entering everyone into their jamaa'ah, by accommodating everybody, of all orientations, by using a very broad general form of da'wah, and using general statements that everyone would agree with²¹.

So by capitalising on the events of the Gulf War, and the various emotive aspects of it, these individuals came out, seeking their opportunity, to invite the people to the ideologies and methodologies that they had been acquiring and learning during the past decade or more (from the Ikhwaanee figureheads who were found in Saudi Arabia).

These sub-objectives that they worked upon would allow them to reach their overall objective, which was whatever was represented in the thoughts of Bannaa, Qutb and Mawdudi. When this occurred, and these people came out in the open and made an open invitation to their da'wah, a great deal of confusion was brought, and they entered Ikhwanified concepts and ideas into the youth. The period from 1990 to 1995 contained great confusion, and it unleashed Ikhwani concepts, principles and ideals, disguised in the garb of Salafiyyah, because these ideas came from a people who had outwardly identified with Salafiyyah, and with the Salafee aqeedah, and had even defence of some aspects of it, such as refuting the Soofees, or refuting the Asha'rees and so on. But they had been nurtured upon the methodologies of the Ikhwaan.

²¹ As has been pointed out by the author of “al-Qutibiyyah Hiyal Fitnah Fa'rifoohaa”.

2.4 Expression of the Two Strains of Ikhwaanee Thought

The actual controversies subsequently raised after the Gulf War (in the affairs of manhaj and aspects of the aqeedah) were traceable to their original roots, which were those two distinct trends of thought that al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimoon entered upon the Ummah, that of Qutb-Mawdudi and that of Hassan al-Banna. After the Gulf war these people made an open call to their da'wah and to their methodologies. This included all of those previously mentioned, Mohammad Suroor, Abdur-Rahman Abdul-Khaaliq, Safar al-Hawaali and Salman al-Awdah and whoever was upon their way.

So what was being done by these people, and which became apparent in later years and more recent times, of justifying working with the people of innovation (in order to collectively “work for Islaam”), claiming that their good can be taken and benefited from, claiming that when refuting, you must mention the good, claiming that the presence of numerous parties and groups brings nothing but benefit for the Ummah, and not caring about who you keep company with, and not asking about people who are involved in the field of da'wah, what are they upon, what is their background, who do they mix with, and claiming and assuming that every person is a Sunnee or a Salafee unless proven otherwise, and not building the aqeedah of walaah and baraa upon any sound foundation, and so on. All of this was actually a result of the original innovation of Hassan al-Banna that destroyed much of the aspects of the Sunnah and the manhaj of the Salaf in this regard. For the sake of brevity, we can call this the expression of the “**B Strain**” of the Ikhwani thought, and we can also refer to this ideological mindset as “**Bannaawitude**”.

And likewise, what manifested itself over the years of the great concern with the rulers, speaking of Tawheed ul-Haakimiyyah, attempting to argue for open rejection and correction of the Rulers, bringing many doubts to justify takfeer and justify the absence of obedience to the Rulers, and highlighting the sin and oppression of the Rulers and so on, arousing the common people against the Rulers, and inciting them, and making the Rulers the scapegoats for the calamities befalling the Ummah, and portraying Jihaad to be the expression of the struggle between the subjects and the rulers and governments and so on. All of this was the result of the original innovations of the Kuffar (their political philosophers of the 19th century)²², the Raafidah Shi'ah (their

²² Compare the themes of “Social Justice” that are common between the likes of Mawdudi, and Qutb, and the Socio-political Philosophers of the French, Marxist, Communist and other Revolutions (such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Voltaire, Marx and others), and you will see that they all drink from the same fountain, which is the original fountain of Dhul-Khuwaisarah at-Tameemee, the Father of the Khawaarij, who showed opposition to the highest authority of Islaam, the Messenger (sallallaahu alaihi wasallam), under the banner of “Social Justice”, when he claimed that justice was not done in the division of the booty, and thus justified and opened the door to the exiting of obedience (in whatever is good) to those whom Allaah and His Messenger (sallallaahu alaihi wasallam) made obedience obligatory, even if they stole the wealth, and beat the people, and were not establishing social justice, and even if they had the hearts of devils in the bodies of men. Thus the Western Philosophers spoke of revolutions and rebellions, in the name of social justice, and the likes of Mawdudi and Qutb, too spoke of revolutions and rebellions in the name of social justice.

This is also why you saw writers such as Qutb portraying Islam in the form of “Socialism” or “Communism”, claiming Islam is a mixture of Communism and Christianity and other values, and Mawdudi saying that Islam has elements of both Facsim (i.e. like that of Mussolini) and also Communism. All of these people entered into (and were entered upon by way of) politics and socio-political philosophies that they entered into and tried to evaluate and analyse, becoming affected by them in their reformative ideas, and they exaggerated concerning it. And these ideas came to them only from the Kuffar, as they are the ones who innovated revolutions and coups, and populist, mass-oriented methods as independent, defined methodologies of political, social and economic change. This is fundamentally opposed to the methodology of the Prophets and that of the Book and the Sunnah. The likes of Qutb and Mawdudi merely took these ideas or influences and placed them within the context of an Islamic awakening that was opposed to the emerging secular “modernity”, and then tried to justify them by arguing for them by their literary discourse and using what would support them by way of false ta’weels (interpretations) of the Book, the Sunnah, and historical occurrences within the Muslim Ummah.

Similarly the idea of “Democratic Revolution” which many of the callers are upon are also ideologies propounded by the likes of Rousseau and others, and this in reality, the fountain of Hassan al-Bannaa, whose methodology was to amass the people together, regardless of aqeedah or manhaj, and to unite them under a single banner (al-Ikhwaan) and then to penetrate the political arena, or political system and machinery, and by way of it, to establish and work towards an Islamic authority. And this is also what Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq was upon, who was rightly called a “Shurocrat” by Shaykh Muqbil, because he distorted the idea of Shooraa in Islaam in order to justify working by way of democracy and bringing about change.

Know that just like the bid’ah of Qadr came from a Christian by the name of Soosan or Sansawaih (refer to the introduction to al-Laalikaa’ees Sharh Usool il-I’tiqaad), and was taken from him by an individual called Ma’bad al-Juhanee, and was then unleashed upon the Ummah, causing them to dispute and become divided and to destroy the affairs of the deen, then similarly, the likes of these ignorant writers of the 20th century (who were Asha’rees, Mu’tazilees far away from Salafiyah) they took the political discourse of the 19th century philosophers, or were influenced by them, and then propounded methodologies of reform similar to those of the Kuffar, that were fundamentally opposed to the Book and the Sunnah; ideas which have not produced any success, or any stability, or any authority or power for the Muslims, from the time of their inception till this day. Rather, nothing but bloodshed and destruction has followed.

And some of the shrewd and intelligent ones from the Kuffar have actually made this observation themselves, as they know their own history and ideologies which shaped Europe (prior to the French Revolution and after) and what they brought of destruction, horror and bloodshed. Robert Worth, writing for the New York Times (13th October 2001), observes, “As Fathi Yakan, one of Qutb’s disciples, wrote in the 1960’s: “The groundwork for the French Revolution was laid by Rousseau, Voltaire and Montesquieu; the Communist Revolution realized plans set by Marx, Engels and Lenin... The same holds true for us as well.”.”

So just like the bid’ah of Qadr came from a Christian, and the bid’ah of Tashayyu’ came from a Jew, and the bid’ah of the denial of Allaah’s Attributes came from Ja’d bin Dirham, (whose Islam was doubted by some, at-Tabaree said he was an Atheist who introduced the innovation of the speech of Allaah being created), and they were adopted and spread within the Ummah, often being changed, reformed and presented in different ways. And this was in the arena of beliefs, then similarly, what we see of these methodologies of reform, involving revolutions, and democracy and appeals to the masses, and the so called “awakening”, then their ideological roots trace back to the Philosophers of the disbelievers. We have already quoted what Shaykh al-Albaani was asked, “What is called in the current times as a military overthrow (coup) against the ruler, is this from the religion or is it an innovation?” The Shaykh replied, “These actions have no basis in Islaam, and it is in opposition to the Islamic manhaj in laying down the foundations of the da’wah, and bringing about a righteous land for it. **For this is one of the innovations of the disbelievers by which some of the Muslims have been**

concept of Imaamah), Mawdudi and Mohammad Qutb²³ and Sayyid Qutb²⁴, all of which destroyed much of the aspects of the Sunnah and the methodologies of the Salaf in this regard, and which also brought about much destruction and harm to the welfare of Muslims in the various lands. We can call this the expression of the “**Q Strain**” of the Ikhwani thought and we can also refer to this ideological mindset as “**Qutbitude**”.²⁵

affected by, and this is what I mentioned in commenting and explaining al-Aqeedah at-Tahaawiyah” (al-Asaalah vol. 10, 1414H).

²³ Some of these individuals like Mohammad Qutb were known to have studied and specialised in the Industrial Revolution in Europe and the era of Enlightenment following the Dark Ages (of Europe). These times contained radical transformation of ideas in the social, political and economic field. And no doubt, the influence that came to them from these studies reflected in the methodologies that they would later propound or the general orientations that they would be upon in terms of intellectual thoughts, concepts and approaches.

²⁴ It is not surprising that there occurred from the likes of these people revilement and mockery of some of the Prophets of Allaah, revilement of ‘Uthmaan (radiiallahu anhu), takfeer of some of the Sahaabah and accusing them with hypocrisy, deception and treachery, and vile words about Islaam, such as it being a concoction of Communism and Christianity, with some added morals and values. So do not be surprised in the least about what can be found in some of their books, after you have looked at where these ideas originated from, and where their roots lie.

²⁵ The terms “Qutbitude” and “Bannaawitude” have been coined to make it easier to refer to these concepts, ideologies and methodologies. So instead of writing a lengthy paragraph containing a list of all the principles and ideologies and methodologies, each time, we will simply refer to them as “Qutbitude” or “Bannaawitude”. When used in the singular (i.e. Qutbitude, Bannaawitude) the term refers to either a single aspect of the ideology or the ideology as a whole, and when used in plural (i.e. qutbitudes, bannaawitudes) it refers to a collection of different aspects of the ideology and methodology or isolated principles, each of which represent mental attitudes and outlooks. So for example, making supplication against the ruler as opposed to making it for him, that he is rectified and corrected (which is the actual Sunnah), is a “qutbitude”. Or claiming that collective work is obligatory and then using that to justify collaborating with Ikhwaan and Tableegh and the people of Hizbiyyah, is a “bannaawitude”. So these represent mental attitudes built upon underlying doctrines or methodologies or principles.

We have used this terminology due to its similarity to what was coined as **Negritude** by Aimé Césaire, a French speaking black writer. It is, “... originally a literary and ideological movement of French-speaking black intellectuals, [Negritude] reflects an important and comprehensive reaction to the colonial situation. This movement, which influenced Africans as well as Blacks around the world, specifically rejects the political, social and moral domination of the West. The term, which has been used in a general sense to describe the black world in opposition to the West, assumes the total consciousness of belonging to the black race.” (Abiola Irele, *The African Experience in Literature and Ideology*, 1981, from an online source).

Bannaawitude is the literary and ideological movement of Egyptian activists, reflecting a comprehensive reaction to British colonialism in Egypt (and elsewhere), embodied in the visionary thought of Hassan al-Banna, which served to better the social and economic sphere of life of ordinary Egyptians living under colonial rule, and give them self-determination. This was merely an extension of the thought of Jamaal ud-Deen al-Afghaanee around half a century ealier. **Qutbitude** is the literary and ideological reaction to Nasserite Egypt, a reaction born specifically out of the comprehensive rejection of Nasserite secular nationalist authority, and which gave birth to the main ideological concepts of jaahiliyyah, takfeer, haakimiyyah, and khurooj, within the backdrop of considerable influence from the Leninist-Marxist discourse and polemic against Capitalism, and the philosophy of Alexis Carrel.


These two distinct mindsets and mental attitudes would manifest themselves in various fitnahs that emerged following the Gulf War, upon until the current times, from people outwardly claiming Salafiyyah, but who were in reality, upon aspects of Bannaawitude and Qutbitude, or remnants of them.

The figure below provides an overview of what has been discussed so far in this section, and gives a general macro-view of what has taken place of the migration of the Ikhwaanee ideologies to the ranks of the Salafees and to the Salafee da'wah.

The basic ideological origins make up and framework of Bannaawitude and Qutbitude can be traced back to the ideology and thought of Jamaal ud-Deen al-Afghaanee, the father of all modern-day activist groups and parties.

The Entrance of the Ikhwani Ideology Into the Ranks of the Salafees

www.spubs.com
Version 1.5



KEY

- Ideological Concepts of Mawdudi
- Ideological Concepts of Sayyid Qutb
- Ideological Concepts of Hassan al-Banna
- Ikhwaanees of the Gulf Region going for Afghani Jihaad
- Salafees from Gulf going for Afghani Jihad
- Takfeeri elements entering, or returning to Gulf region, or filtering through to Salafees after Gulf War

We must now understand (following the Gulf war and the immediate few years that followed it) that we are in a situation and a context in which much of the Sunnah and the manhaj of the Salaf has been lost and forgotten and destroyed, especially in these two arenas (outlined above), as it relates to the Salafees, since in other arenas of the Sunnah, the aspects of Aqaa'id (beliefs), they were clear, such as the deviation of the Ash'arees, and the Modernists and the Soofees and the Shi'ah and so on. This was because many of those who came to Salafiyyah in these times, or prior to these times, obviously came from the route of aqeedah, realising that the Salafee aqeedah was the truth. However, from the aspects of manhaj, they had not comprehensively entered into the true and correct methodologies during this time, because of the absence of clarity at this time and the spread of confusion (due to the various reasons and events we have covered so far). So the Usool (fundamentals of the Sunnah) in relation to these affairs have been forgotten and destroyed, or confused and mixed up, and there is no clarity, and many people thought that being Salafee was being opposed to the Asha'rees and Soofees and Hizb ut-Tahreer, and the Ikhwaan in general (without knowing the realities in detail), and the Shi'ah and other than them. Those who were upon clarity all the way through were the Scholars of Ahl us-Sunnah, the Salafee Scholars, those upon the Salafee manhaj. However, it would take many years and the transpiring of many events (involving the refutation of specific individuals some of whom turned Innovators)²⁶, before the clarifications of these Scholars, their refutations, and their purifying of the manhaj, would filter down and come to the realisation and attention of the Salafees in every place.

So the situation is that people are emerging and engaging in da'wah (both before and after the Gulf War) at a time when there is no clarity amongst the people in general as to the specific details of the Salafee manhaj, the Usool of the Sunnah and the understanding of the Salaf in certain areas, especially those areas in which Ikhwaan brought those two destructive trends (the Q and B strains of Ikhwani thought)²⁷. This is with the exception of the Scholars of the Salafee manhaj who were upon clarity and firmness and were not affected by any of these ideologies, in their knowledge, or da'wah or manhaj, due to their being firmly grounded in the affairs of aqeedah and manhaj²⁸.

The thing to note here is that in this period of time, due to the effects of Ikhwaan (spanning the previous couple of decades), there were many manaahij that had been entered in the field of the da'wah of Ahl us-Sunnah, and over time, they became the accepted norms and standards (due to the ignorance of the general people in this

²⁶ Such as those who figureheads who were propagating Qutbitudes and Bannaawitudes amongst the people, in their da'wah, during the last decade, after the Gulf War.

²⁷ Our focus here is on the United Kingdom, and thus the timescale we are speaking about are the late 80s and early 90s. And this may vary from other countries and other places in the West. However, the analysis and observations made are more or less similar to each place, since this fitnah reached all parts of the globe.

²⁸ Like Imaam Ibn Baaz, Imaam Ibn Uthaymeen, Imaam al-Albaani, Shaykh Saalih al-Fawzaan, Shaykh Rabee' bin Haadee, Shaykh Abdul-Muhsin al-Abbaad, Shaykh Muhammad Amaan al-Jaamee, Shaykh Muqbil and many other notable Scholars from Ahl us-Sunnah.

regard). This was because at that time, many of the Salafee Scholars had good opinions of some of these Jamaa'at that emerged and which were responsible for these ideologies and manaahij, and the Scholars had husn udh-dhann (good opinion) for them (before their true realities became apparent), and believed that they were working for Islaam and were sincere, and intended goodness. However, by way of these Jamaa'at many manaahij were entered into the da'wah, and these manaahij were such that they affected peoples speech, action, walaa and baraa', method of da'wah and so on - even if at the same time, the people were entering into Salafiyyah from the point of view of aqaa'id and ibaadaat and fiqh. The realities of these Jamaa'at would become clear in later times, especially after the Gulf War.

And when people did enter Salafiyyah from these avenues of aqeedah, ibaadah and fiqh (over the last two decades or so), there was a strong tendency to believe that one had entered into Salafiyyah completely, and this led to the focusing of the da'wah of the Salafees, or those who ascribed to Salafiyyah at that time within certain directions, especially as it related to refuting the opposers. So the Soofees' and Asha'rees, and Hizb ut-Tahreer and the people of Takfeer in general, and the Madhhabists and others, were focused upon by the Salafees, but there was still a great deal of ignorance and indifference with respect to the sum whole of the various qutbitudes and bannaawitudes that were being unleashed or had been unleashed upon the da'wah, many of which became the accepted norms and standards of manhaj amongst unsuspecting Salafees, and which were in reality opposed to the Usool of the Sunnah and the manhaj of the Salaf. Thus for a period of time spanning many years, many people traversed upon the Salafee aqeedah, but were upon the methodologies and principles of the Ikhwaan, and had adopted numerous bannaawitudes that became the order of the day, as it related to implementation in the da'wah, cooperation with the people of hizbiyyah, issues of refuting and criticising, issues of walaa and baraa and so on.

2.5 More Influences of These Ideas upon “Islamist” Reformists

In Part 1 we illustrated the influence of the collective discourse of the 19th century philosophers upon the emerging Muslim thinkers and reformers of the same period who were a reaction to the emergence of Europe, its colonial activities and advancements. The example was given by tracing the ideological roots of the so-called Iranian Raafidee “Islamic Revolution” directly back to the ideas of the French Sartre and the German Heidegger.

Here we will simply give a few more illustrations of how later activists were influenced by similar ideas, or remnants of these ideas which actually came to them through the route of the Bannaa-Mawdudee-Qutb trilogy, who served as the route by which some of these alien and foreign doctrines and ideologies (that have their basis in the ideologies of the Kuffar) were entered into Islaam, and then amongst Ahl us-Sunnah, and then in a more pronounced way, after the Gulf War, when some of those outwardly claiming Salafiyyah became more vocal and open in calling to their deviant methodologies.

So another illustration, Safar al-Hawali, speaking about the results of the Revolution in France says, “The French Revolution ended up with some highly important outcomes. Indeed there was born for the first time in the history of Christian Europe, a non-religious republican State. Its philosophy was based upon ruling in the name of the people instead of the name of Allaah, on the freedom of belief, instead of Catholicism, on individualism instead of being restricted by the religious product, and on man-made rule instead of the decisions of the Church.” (“al-‘Ilmaaniyyah”, Secularism, p. 169).

Then years later (under continued influence from Mohammad Qutb al-Ash’aree)²⁹, you see him affected by and propounding the revolutionary manhaj of Sayyid Qutb, in

²⁹ As for Safar al-Hawali writing a refutation of the Ash’ariyyah, then know that these people (i.e. al-Hawali and the remaining Ikhwaanees with him) are a people of Irjaa’, to whom Salafiyyah is envisaged only from a theoretical perspective. Indeed, their slogan is well-known, “Salafi in Aqeedah, Contemporary in Orientation”, and they mean by this that our beliefs are Salafee, yet our methodologies are in conformity with what the times require. However, this so called attachment to Salafiyyah is one in which only beliefs are included (and actions of the heart tied to the actions of the limbs are not), such that no walaa and baraa is tied to these beliefs, and no actions of the heart are tied to these beliefs. Thus, despite what is found with Sayyid Qutb of the Mu’tazilee, Jahmee, Ash’aree doctrines, then they do not utter a word, and nor do they make walaa or baraa upon this, and they hate that these affairs should be raised and discussed. Instead they treacherously accuse the Scholars of Ahl us-Sunnah of innovation and misguidance (such as what they did with Shaykh al-Albaanee) whilst raising the Ash’aree heretics to the levels of great Imaams. This proves that these individuals are upon Irjaa’ since they think that Salafiyyah is only a set of beliefs that are held, without them having any implications upon a person’s speech, and his actions and his walaa and baraa’, and that merely by holding these beliefs, one is a Salafee. This is like the Jahmiyyah saying, that with mere belief in Allaah, one is a Believer. And as for these, to them, the mere affirmation of the Salafee aqeedah, makes one a Salafee and thereafter, your speech and action and walaa and baraa matters not, and you can behave how you like in your da’wah, in your methodologies, in your walaa and baraa and so on.

So do not be surprised that these people write in refutation of the Ash’ariyyah, and then it has no effect upon their behaviour and their walaa and baraa and their methodologies and in their stances towards the Ash’aree Innovators whom they befriended, rather whom they raised as Imaams and the great “Thinkers” of Islaam. And know that this concern with aqeedah is only something that is

order to establish the Rule of Allaah, with a revolutionary mode that is not far from that of the French Revolution whose important outcomes he noted many years earlier. The only difference here is that it is to establish the Islamic Politic, by the same methods.

Safar al-Hawali stated, quoting word for word, the saying of Sayyid Qutb, and seeking evidence by way of it: “Indeed, the meaning of this announcement is to snatch away the misappropriated authority of Allaah and return it back to Allaah and repel those who usurped it, those who judge the people by way of legislations from themselves, or who lay down for them methodologies of worship and coming closer (to Allaah) besides those that Allaah legislated. And hence, they take the position of Lords towards the people and the people take the position of worshippers towards them... Indeed, its meaning is to demolish the kingdom of mankind in order to establish the kingdom of Allaah upon the earth, or to use the Qur’anic expression, “He is in the Heavens an Ilaah and in the Earth an Ilaah, and He is all-Wise, all-Knowing”.”

And Qutb also said, “And the establishment of the kingdom of Allaah upon the earth and ending the kingdom of mankind, and snatching the authority from the hands of the usurpers amongst the servants and returning it back to Allaah alone, and giving authority to the Divine Sharee’ah alone, and abolishing the human laws ... all of that cannot be completed by mere tableegh (conveying) and bayaan (explaining), since those who enslave the servants, those who usurp the authority of Allaah in the earth, they will not submit in their authority, with mere tableegh (conveying) and bayaan (explaining).”³⁰

These are quotes from Sayyid Qutb, included in “adh-Dhaahirah” (p.44) of Safar al-Hawaali, which al-Hawali uses as support and evidence, and there is clearly an incitement to revolution and violence (beyond mere negotiation) in order to “snatch” away the authority from its usurpers. Not too different from the way in which authority was snatched in the French revolution whose outcomes al-Hawali discussed years earlier.

Sayyid Qutb also stated, in laying down his manhaj (to be later propounded by Safar al-Hawaali): “They (the Arabs) used to know the meaning of “ilaah” from their language, and the meaning of “laa ilaaha illallaaha”, they used to know that al-Uloohiyyah means “al-Haakimiyyah al-’Ulyaa”. They used to know that “Laa ilaaha illallaaha” is a revolution (thawrah) against the earthly authority that has usurped the most special of the characteristics of Uloohiyyah and it is a revolution (thawrah) upon the various

theoretical (with the exception of those matters from the aqeedah that are tied to their manhaj and which are required by it), it has no implications to them, upon their da’wah and their walaa and baraa’, which is why you see the mentor of Safar al-Hawaali, Mohammad Qutb he is a “dangerous Ash’aree” (as explained by Shaykh Hammad al-Ansaaree), and Sayyid Qutb is an Asha’ree and has other innovations on top of that, and despite that they (al-Hawaali and others) do not take a sound, Salafee, Sunnee stance in these affairs.

³⁰ Meaning, violence is needed, and that is the only thing that is required to achieve the goal of giving Allaah’s authority back to Him!

structures that are based upon the principle of this usurpation, and it is a rebellion (khurooj) upon the various powers that judge by legislations from their own selves and for which Allaah gave no authority” (az-Zilaal 2/1005).

Al-Hawaali was also one of the key and influential backers and sentimental ideologists of the Algerian Revolution, and his tapes and lectures were a strong support to those who were upon the methodologies of Sayyid Qutb in Algeria, as well as many of those who were deceived by them, thinking themselves to be upon Salafiyah.³¹

Another illustration is that of Salman al-Awdah, who also manifested this revolutionary ideology. This was the da'wah given by Salman al-Awdah to the Algerians when he advised them, **“Indeed, I believe that the time for making complaints has ended – or it has almost ended. I mean that the role played by the good, liberal men and women should not end at merely raising complaints to specific individuals, that “so and so happened” and “so and so happened”.**” (Cassette: “Humoom Multazimah” no. 106). Note that these words are a replica of the statement of Sayyid Qutb quoted earlier, “all of that (i.e. establishing Allaah’s Kingdom) cannot be completed by mere tableegh (conveying) and bayaan (explaining)” – meaning the use of force and violence.

He said, “Why do many people imagine that self-sacrifice, and being persistent, patient and forbearing is a quality unique only to the heretical societies and is the way of the astray (nations) only, and that the Jews, Christians and Communists and others are sacrificed... **and all the people saw how the defenseless Communists used to stand in front of the tanks after the revolution, with their bare chests... and many people think that the people of “Laa ilaaha ilallaaha” are not able to defend their religion and that they are not able to show patience over it. Why do we have an evil opinion of the people of Laa ilaaha illallaaha, to this level?! Why are we belittling the affair of all these Muslim masses in Algeria and other than Algeria...**” (Cassette: Kalimatu Haqqin Fee Mas’alat il-Jazaa’iriyah)

Here, he makes an example of the Communists of China, and the occurrences of Tiananmen Square when over a 1000 Chinese were massacred on June 4th 1989, some of them being bold in standing in front of the armies approaching tanks. And by this example he intends to say that if this is what the Communist disbelievers (whilst feeling sorry for them) are capable of, then one must not have an evil opinion of the Muslims in Algeria. This is pure incitement to violence and revolution – and the cassettes of Safar and Salman were inspirational to a faction of the Algerian population, who later participated in the fighting and pillage.

Shaykh al-Albaani was asked, “What is called in the current times as a military overthrow (coup) against the ruler, is this from the religion or is it an innovation?” The Shaykh replied, “These actions have no basis in Islaam, and it is in opposition to the Islamic manhaj in laying down the foundations of the da'wah, and bringing about a

³¹ Shaykh IbnUthaymeen would later warn from these cassettes, in the year 2000CE, due to what they contained of the destructive revolutionary ideology.

righteous land for it. **For this is one of the innovations of the disbelievers by which some of the Muslims have been affected by**, and this is what I mentioned in commenting and explaining al-Aqeedah at-Tahaawiyyah” (al-Asaalah vol. 10, 1414H).

Shaykh al-Albaani (rahimahullaah) said, in his introduction to the book “Madaarik un-Nadhar” which exposes the Qutbiyyeen, like Safar al-Hawaali and Salman al-Awdah and makes their ignorance clear – so he said, “With the shortage of time, my poor health and my engagement in knowledge-related activity, I found myself strained to read it. Every time I read a section of it, causing more ailment to myself, I felt that I should be content with it [i.e. complete it]. [I continue in this manner] until I managed to read all of it. So I found it in truth to be unique in its subject, containing true realities about some of the du’aat (callers) and their methodologies that oppose what the Salaf us-Salih were upon. And I benefited from it personally, and acquired numerous points of benefit with respect to the Algerian revolution, and some of the figures who were behind it, as well as those who aided them with their whimsical sentiments, and those who exaggerated in strengthening this revolt from amongst those who do not concern themselves with the principle of Tasfiyah and Tarbiyah.” (p.7, 2nd Edition).

Another illustration is the resurgence of the democratic discourse of Mohammad Abduh (1849-1905) in the methodologies propounded by Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq of Ihyaa at-Turaath. Abduh was a proponent of parliamentary democracy. “Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), defended pluralism³² and sought to refute the claim that it would undermine the unity of the Ummah. He argued that the European nations were not divided by it. The reason, he concluded, was that their objectives had been the same. What varied was the method they pursued toward accomplishing it”, writes the author of “Political Pluralism in Modern Arab Islamic Thought”³³. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood, to whom Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq showed great opposition, in his earlier days, had also involved itself in parliamentary elections as part of its da’wah efforts. In fact the Brotherhood would later cooperate with other factions, “The parliamentary elections of 1987 demonstrated to the government the considerable potential of the Brotherhood, which had entered into an alliance with the Labour and Liberal parties under the common slogan “Islam is the Solution”.” (Al-Ahram Weekly 11 - 17 March 1999)

The concepts and ideas contained in this summarisation of the thought of Mohammad Abduh and the Ikhwaan are the very ones that laid the basis for the reformative methodologies of Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq in later times. The concept of Shoora was used by him to legitimise entry into parliamentary elections as an independent methodology of reform, trying to justify it under the slogan of the obligation of collective work (al-’amal al-jamaa’ee), and likewise he argued for the

³² Pluralism refers to a variety of different ways, or viewpoints being legitimate representations of a single truth or reality. It refers generally to the acceptance of diversity and tolerance within a society.

³³ The author of this article is Azzaam Tamimi, one of the astray Ikhwanis based in the UK who writes on political thought of Islamic Activists.

pluralism (i.e. multiplicity) in Islamic groups. This ideology of his led to Ihyaa at-Turaath to cooperate with the Raafidah Shi'ah in Kuwait.

He states in 'al-Wasaayaa al-Ashr" (Ten pieces of Advice), which was released as No. 1 in the series "The Pillars of Jihad in Da'wah" and was distributed for free, so he says in the ninth advice:

"And this is a mighty piece of advice and a collection of some bare realities:

a) That there are many Jamaa'ahs established throughout the Islamic world and they are separated by the physical distances between them and they also differ in their priorities (i.e. goals)...

b) In my view, this multiplicity was, and has never ceased to be, a manifest and positive goodness and it has benefited the Islamic Jihad greatly. And this is because the political structures and the prevailing circumstances do not allow for the presence of a [single] large and organised effort for the establishment of da'wah...

(p.55) ...and likewise the multiplicity of groups has played an extremely important role in perfecting the different facets (suwar pl. of soorah) of Islam. So what some of the groups neglected was attended to by others who concerned themselves with it. And in such a manner has a true and complete picture (soorah) of Islam emerged, due to the presence and establishment of such groups and due to the scholars and other righteous people...

(p.57)... And whenever there is more than one group set up in the same location, it gives rise to competition for goodness and racing towards the good. So each Jamaa'ah will be highly concerned with fulfilling its duties, goals... and it is from such competition that Islaam will benefit from. And as for the presence of a single Jamaa'ah for da'wah in a single location, then this by necessity brings about laziness, neglect..."

He also wrote in 'Mashroo'iyat al-'Amal al-Jamaa'ee' (The Legislation of Collective Work):

"d) The Negative Aspects of Some of the Groups: The fourth aspect from which those who issued the verdict of the forbiddance of groups was that these groups had some negative elements to them, such as holding onto innovations and deviating from some of the Sunans, and also the appearance of disagreement and separation between the followers of every Jamaa'ah... and it is for this reason that some of their gave a verdict, in their claim, that these Jamaa'ahs lead to separation and that they promote the spread of some innovations or abandonment of the Sunnah, and as long as this exists, they are unlawful (to exist)... **This statement contains a great and mighty shortcoming.**"

And there are also the contents of a cassette in late 1995, or early 1996, which is transcribed in "an-Nasr ul-Azeez 'alaa ar-Radd al-Wajeez" (pp.163-164), "The questioner asks him (Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq) about the verdict of Shaikh

Abdul-Azeez Bin Baaz (concerning the peace treaty) which was in al-Muslimoon magazine (23rd December 1995) and which also contained the refutations of al-Qaradaawi, the Straying Innovator, against it. He answered the question by giving a diplomatic answer which indicated that he was not actually pleased with this fatwaa (i.e. of Ibn Baaz) and this was after his recantation by a long time since his recantation took place on 14th Rabee' ul-Awwal 1415H, corresponding to 20th September 1994. Then the questioner said to him, "O Shaikh, in relation to the multiplicity of Islamic groups in the Islamic world and their abundance, such as al-Ikhwaan ul-Muslimoon, Jamaa'at ut-Tabligh, Hizb ut-Tahreer and others, we hear two views. One saying this is a good thing because the good points (of this multiplicity) outweigh the bad points. Another orientation which says that this is differing and splitting and this is not allowed because its bad points are greater than its good points?" To which Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq replied, "**Indeed this is a good thing absolutely and there are no negative points in this at all, in splitting and differing (i.e. diversity). This is not correct...**" The questioner said after, "There is an orientation which states that evil of the multiplicity of groups in the Islamic world outweighs the good, what is your view on this?". To which he replied, "**This is destruction (hadm), destruction, destruction this is. This is an action of destruction**".

So this is merely a reflection of the pluralist thought of Mohammad Abduh during the close of the 19th century. Both Abduh and Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq originate from Egypt (as do Hassan al-Banna, and Sayyid Qutb). Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq also adopted the ideas of Sayyid Qutb with respect to Haakimiyyah, along lines similar to those of Safar al-Hawali, and he also adopted the Ikhwaani paradigm of reform, that had its roots in the thought of Hassan al-Banna.

In closing this chapter, we can state again, what we stated in an earlier section:

In short, the intellectual origins of the so called "Islamic Awakening" or the "Sahwah³⁴ as the Activists call it, with its associated array of methodologies; actually lie in 19th century European philosophy, and the subsequent reaction to that genre by the "Islamists" over the past 200 years. **Individuals like Qutb, Mawdudi and Hassan al-Banna and their ideologies emerged from this type of environment**. All of

³⁴ "And Shaykh Bakr Abu Zaid said in his book, "Mu'jam al-Manaahi al-Lafdhiyyah" (p.209), concerning the phrase, "as-Sahwah al-Islaamiyyah", "This description has not had any judgement passed over it by Allaah, since it is a new term and we do not know of it ever having been used upon the tongues of any of the Salaf. Its usage only came about in the openings of the 15th century after hijrah, after the Disbelievers, **such as the Christians returned to the Church, and then it slowly found its way to the Muslims**. Hence, it is not permissible for the Muslims to take on the "foreign clothing" from them in the affairs of the religion, and nor the creation of slogans that Allaah and His Messenger have not granted permission for, since the Islamic terms are restricted to a text: Islaam, Imaan, Ihsaan, Taqwaa, and then the one who ascribes to them, Muslim, Mu'min, Muhsin, Taqiy. So I wish I only knew what exactly is this ascription to this innovated 'as-Sahwah al-Islaamiyyah', crying out loud or what??" End of quote from Jamaal bin Fareehaan al-Haaritheh (Al-Ajwibah al-Mufeedah of Shaykh al-Fawzaan, pp.85-87). **Note:** Shaykh Bakr Abu Zaid has yet to repent from his false defence of Sayyid Qutb and his four-page article that is devoid of any evidences, in reply to Shaykh Rabe'e's refutations of Sayyid Qutb. Many of the people of knowledge rejected this from Shaykh Bakr Abu Zaid, including Shaykh Salih al-Fawzaan. Shaykh Rabe'e' subsequently wrote a full refutation of these four pages in his book "al-Hadd al-Faasil", which is around 150 pages in length.

these methodologies were actually opposed to the methodologies of the Prophets, as the Scholars of Ahl us-Sunnah would later clarify, amongst them Imaam al-Albaani, Imaam Ibn Baaz, Imaam Ibn Uthaymeen, Shaykh Saalih al-Fawzaan, Shaykh Rabe'e bin Haadee and others. Whereas the likes of Qutb, Bannaa and Mawdudi, came out under the banner of Islaam to call to their ideologies, their contemporary followers, like the Qutbiyyah of Saudi Arabia, the Takfeerees and the likes of Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq and his Ihyaa at-Turaath, came out under the banner of Salafiyyah to call to their deviant ideologies, the same ones that had been initiated by Qutb, Bannaa and Mawdudi, but this time in more refined and devised ways.